Semiparametric Estimation in Models of First-price, Sealed-bid Auctions with Affiliation∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
Within the affiliated private-values paradigm, we develop a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price, sealed-bid auctions that admits a general dependence structure. The model is nonparametrically identified, but estimating the primitives is plagued by the curse of dimensionality when the number of bidders is even modestly large, so we develop a semiparametric estimation strategy, focusing on the Archimedean family of copulas and implementing this framework using a particular member—the Frank copula. We apply our framework to data from low-price, sealedbid auctions used by the Michigan Department of Transportation to procure roadresurfacing services, rejecting the hypothesis of independence and finding significantly positive (and high) dependence in cost signals. JEL Classification Numbers: C20, D44, L1.
منابع مشابه
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