Games of Threats
نویسنده
چکیده
A game of threats on a finite set of players, N , is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S ⊆ N , such that d(S) = −d(N \S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d(∅) = 0. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coaltional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each player an average of the threat powers, d(S), of the coalitions that include the player.
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