A New Family of Practical Non-Malleable Diffie-Hellman Protocols

Cryptography algorithm standards play a key role both to the practice of information securityand to cryptography theory research. Among them, the MQV and HMQV protocols ((H)MQV, inshort) are a family of (implicitly authenticated) Diffie-Hellman key-exchange (DHKE) protocols thatare widely standardized and deployed. In this work, from some new perspectives and approaches andunder some new design rationales and insights, we develop a new family of practical implicitly authen-ticated DHKE protocols, which enjoy notable performance among security, privacy, efficiency andeasy deployment. We make detailed comparisons between our new DHKE protocols and (H)MQV,showing that the newly developed protocols outperform HMQV in most aspects. Along the way,guided by our new design rationales, we also identify a new vulnerability of (H)MQV, which bringssome new perspectives (e.g., session-key computational fairness) to the literature.