Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Sequential Search
نویسنده
چکیده
Diamond's 'paradox' (1971) showed that in a market where consumers search sequentially and have strictly positive search costs the unique price equilibrium is where all firms charge the monopoly price. This paper demonstrates that Diamond's result depends crucially on the assumption of single commodity search and does not persist when the model is generalised to allow multi-commodity search. A model is presented where identical consumers search optimally (sequentially) and with positive search costs for two commodities. Firms supply only one of the commodity types so consumers are required to sample at least two firms to satisfy their consumption requirements. Within industries firms are identical, producing a homogenous product at the same, constant, marginal cost. The equilibrium is shown to display price dispersion, in fact no two firms charge the same price with positive probability. Comparative statics are conducted and it is demonstrated that the price dispersion depends solely on the search behaviour of consumers, converging to the competitive price as search costs converge to zero. Changes in industry demand effect equilibrium prices only through the indirect impact the change in demand has on the consumers' search behaviour.
منابع مشابه
Price competition, Sequential Search and Sellers’ rationality
We consider a sequential search model with two types of consumers: (‘high cost’s) consumers who incur a positive search cost at each visit and informed consumers who visit all the firms at no cost. The objective is to compare Nash market predictions with a market with adaptive sellers using reinforcement learning. Simulation Results show that Reinforcement Learning never converges to Nash equil...
متن کاملMarket equilibrium with FSS search
It is acknowledged that in the trading of homogeneous goods there is persistent price dispersion. However, it is theoretically derived that if buyers are optimizers there is no price dispersion. This negative result motivates the emergence of alternative paths in the literature that studies price dispersion. In Burdett and Judd’s seminal work, buyers follow the sub-optimal fixed sample size sea...
متن کاملLarge and Small Sellers: A Theory of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Sequential Search∗
The paper studies equilibrium pricing in a product market for an indivisible good where buyers search for sellers. Buyers search sequentially for sellers, but do not meet every sellers with the same probability. Specifically, a fraction of the buyers’ meetings lead to one particular large seller, while the remaining meetings lead to one of a continuum of small sellers. In this environment, the ...
متن کاملStrategic complementarities and search market equilibrium
In this paper, we apply supermodular game theory to the equilibrium search literature with sequential search. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing game to exhibit strategic complementarities and prove existence of equilibrium. We then show that price dispersion is inherently incompatible with strategic complementarities in the sense that the Diamond Paradox obtains wh...
متن کاملSearch, Moral Hazard, and Equilibrium Price Dispersion
We characterize optimal contracts for insurance coverage of a service whose price may vary across service providers. Households must engage in costly search to learn the price of a particular service firm, and the presence of insurance reduces incentive to search. We construct a general equilibrium model where the interaction of the insurer, consumers, and service firms endogenously determine t...
متن کامل