Conscious Belief
نویسنده
چکیده
█ Abstract Tim Crane maintains that beliefs cannot be conscious because they persist in the absence of consciousness. Conscious judgments can share their contents with beliefs, and their occurrence can be evidence for what one believes; but they cannot be beliefs, because they don’t persist. I challenge Crane’s premise that belief attributions to the temporarily unconscious are literally true. To say of an unconscious agent that she believes that p is like saying that she sings well. To say she sings well is to say that when she sings, her singing is good. To say that she believes that p is (roughly) to say that when she consciously considers the content that p she consciously affirms (believes) it. I also argue that the phenomenal view of intentional content Crane appears to endorse prima facie commits him to the view, at least controversial, perhaps incoherent, that there is unconscious phenomenology (the intentional contents of unconscious beliefs).
منابع مشابه
Moore ’ s Paradox , Defective Interpretation , Justified Belief and Conscious Belieftheo
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