An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
نویسندگان
چکیده
At the end of the experiment, you will receive a show-up fee of NT$100 plus the NTD converted from the “Standard Currency Units” you have earned in the experiment. (“Standard Currency Units” are the experimental currency units used in the experiment.) The amount of “Standard Currency Units” you will receive, which will be different for each participant, depends on your decision, the decision of others and some random factor. All earnings are paid in private and you are not obligated to tell others how much you have earned.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 91 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015