Mechanism Design without Quasilinearity

نویسندگان

  • Tomoya Kazumura
  • Debasis Mishra
  • Shigehiro Serizawa
چکیده

This paper studies a model of mechanism design when agents’ preferences over transfers need not be quasilinear. In a general model of non-quasilinearity, we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property. We also establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule that can implement it. These results apply to a wide variety of problems (single object auction, multiple object auction, public good provision etc.) under suitable richness of type space. If the richness of type space is relaxed, we provide a Myerson-like characterization if there are only two alternatives. We apply this result to study various problems in private values single object auction setting.

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تاریخ انتشار 2016