The Impact of Liberalization on Wage Levels: Considerations Raised by Strategic Bargaining Analysis
نویسنده
چکیده
Strategic or noncooperative bargaining theory provides potentially fruitful microfoundations for the analysis of exchanges in which both sides enjoy pricesetting power. As Rubinstein (1980) demonstrated in his pioneering contribution, invoking a plausible refinement of Cournot-Nash equilibrium makes it possible to derive unique and often intuitively compelling outcomes from given specifications with respect to preferences, technology, and institutional framework. As such, for example, this approach offers a promising basis for the “Nash program” of grounding axiomatic approaches to cooperative games (such as the Nash bargaining solution) in a well-articulated strategic framework.
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