Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study a collective search process in which tentative proposals arrive sequentially and members of a committee decide whether to accept the current proposal or continue searching. The acceptance decision is made according to a (qualified) majority rule. We study which members have more impact on the decision, as well as the degree of randomness of the decision, as members get patient. When proposals vary along a single dimension, the acceptance set is small, and at most two members determine the outcome whatever the majority rule. When proposals vary along many dimensions, the acceptance set is large except under unanimity, and all members affect the distribution of decisions whatever the majority rule. Various implications are drawn.
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