Attainable payoffs in repeated games with interdependent private information
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper proves folk theorems for repeated games with private information, communication, and monetary transfers, in which signal spaces may be arbitrary, signals may be statistically interdependent, and payoffs for each player may depend on the signals of other players. JEL Classifications: C72 (Noncooperative games), C73 (Stochastic & dynamic games), D82 (Asymmetric & private information) *Email: [email protected]. This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at Stanford University. I thank Susan Athey, Ilya Segal, and Steven Tadelis, my dissertation committee, for their valuable guidance. I am indebted to Satoru Takahashi for pointing out a serious error in a previous version of this paper. I have also benefited from discussions with Jonathan Levin, Navin Kartik, Mark Machina, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Joel Sobel, and Joel Watson, and from the comments of seminar participants at UCSD and the 2005 Southwest EconomicTheory Conference. This research was supported in part by the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. †Minor edits in May 2015
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