Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games

Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC Rocks when Other Criteria Remain Silent

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games

This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheaptalk games and specifically characterizes the set of neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk 2 × 2 coordination games. With a finite message set, this set is finite. As the number of messages goes to infinity, the set expands toward a countable limit. The Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium payoff is its unique cluster poi...

Cheap Talk, Neologisms, and Bargaining

This paper shows that in some bargaining games, cheap talk must matter: the unique neologism-proof equilibrium involves informative talk. A simple tradeoff makes both equilibrium talk and neologisms credible: by saying that he is interested in trading, the buyer encourages the seller to continue to bargain but receives poorer terms of trade if trade occurs. All tj^pes of both parties are (weakl...

Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis

We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of conflict between the sender’s and receivers’ preferences. We find that, as in cheap talk games with just one receiver, information t...

Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary pay...