Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary

T he ongoing conflict in Iraq has sparked a renewed interest in the study of counterinsurgency, leading many to comb the wars of the twentieth century, the “golden age of insurgencies,” for lessons that can be applied to today. Much of this recent analysis has focused on the knowledge gained from fighting Marxist revolutionaries. The insurgent of today, however, is not the Maoist of yesterday. His organization and methods are strikingly different from his twentieth century predecessors. The modern insurgent aims to defeat his opponent by psychological warfare and terrorism instead of military action. He draws his support from criminal networks as opposed to popular mobilization. He fights a netwar not a People’s War. These dissimilarities raise the question of just how much of twentieth century counterinsurgency thought can be applied to twenty-first century conflicts. Methods from past wars are put forth as guiding principles with only a nod towards these differences. Applying these principles without examination could lead, at best, to wasted effort, at worst, to defeat. Sun Tzu said, “Know your enemy.” The structure of a movement, meaning its organization and methods, is the key to understanding it. Modern and Maoist insurgencies are structurally different. In order to be effective, those conducting counterinsurgencies must take into consideration these differences and adapt their methods to the structure of modern adversaries.