CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #14: The Price of Anarchy in Simple Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
With this lecture we commence the fourth part of the course. In the last two parts we took incentive constraints, like DSIC or BIC, as a hard constraint, and subject to this designed the best mechanisms possible. Most of the mechanisms discussed were quite complex — interesting as proofs of concept of what is possible in principle, but not suitable for actual use. This part of the course insists on simple auction formats as a hard constraint, and seeks conditions under which they perform well. That is, we seek auctions with the following two properties.
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CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #16: The Price of Anarchy in First-Price Auctions
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