Voting Blocs , Coalitions and Parties ∗
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition forms a voting bloc to coordinate the voting behavior of its members, acting as a single player and affecting the policy outcome. I prove that there exist stable endogenous voting bloc structures, and in an assembly with two parties I show how the incentives to join a bloc depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. ∗I thank Francis Bloch, Anna Bogomolnaia, Matias Iaryczower, Matt Jackson, Andrea Mattozzi and Tom Palfrey for their comments and suggestions. †Email: [email protected]. Mail: 19 West 4th St, 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10012.
منابع مشابه
Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation
I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous...
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