Accelerated Implementations of the Ascending Proxy Auction
نویسنده
چکیده
Combinatorial auctions have important applications to resource allocation problems. These auctions allow bidders to submit bids for entire packages of goods, rather than on single items. This rich bidder interface allows bidders to specify their preferences more precisely, and as a result, allows for more efficient allocation of resources. However, these allowances to bidders come at a computational cost. This senior thesis addresses the computational issues that arise in a specific type of combinatorial auction, the Ascending Proxy Auction. We develop a novel, accelerated algorithm for computing the outcomes of the Ascending Proxy Auction. We also address numerous computational issues that can be generalized to other combinatorial auction algorithms. Finally, we perform extensive experimentation on the performance of our new algorithm. We show that our new algorithm outperforms prior approaches for certain test cases, and may prove to be a useful tool for making combinatorial auctions a practical choice.
منابع مشابه
IV Testing and Implementation 17 Observations and Near-Direct Implementations of the Ascending Proxy Auction
Chapter 3 of this volume describes the ascending proxy auction mechanism of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), and presents its proven desirable economic properties. However, major obstacles arise in its practical implementation. The primary implementation obstacles are that the mechanism requires a bidder explicitly to enumerate all combinations of interest (for more on communications requirements, s...
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