Designing truthful online mechanisms beyond VCG
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چکیده
Dominance truthful bidding is one of the most desirable features in auction design. In the offline setting, a common technique for ensuring truthful bidding is to start with the VickreyClarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism. However, many difficulties arise when implementing this scheme to an online auction. The main purpose of this paper is to survey recent literature aimed at designing truthful mechanisms in an online auction setting. The paper highlights several scenarios identified in the literature where the application of the VCG scheme is not feasible, and summarizes the recent development in finding alternative solutions. The characterization of truthfulness analogous to results pertaining to the offline setting, the feasibility and potential trade-off in designing alternative solutions are emphasized.
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