Does the Gun Pull the Trigger? Automatic Priming Effects of Weapon Pictures and Weapon Names

More than 30 years ago, Berkowitz and LePage (1967) published the first study demonstrating that the mere presence of a weapon increases aggressive behavior. These results have been replicated in several contexts by several research teams. The standard explanation of this weapons effect on aggressive behavior involves priming; identification of a weapon is believed to automatically increase the accessibility of aggression-related thoughts. Two experiments using a word pronunciation task tested this hypothesis. Both experiments consisted of multiple trials in which a prime stimulus (weapon or nonweapon) was followed by a target word (aggressive or nonaggressive) that was to be read as quickly as possible. The prime stimuli were words in Experiment 1 and pictures in Experiment 2. Both experiments showed that the mere identification of a weapon primes aggression-related thoughts. A process model linking weapons as primes to aggressive behavior is discussed briefly. In 1967, Berkowitz and LePage demonstrated that the presence of weapons (a rifle and a revolver) produced more retaliative aggression against an antagonist than did the presence of badminton rackets. These results, and several failures to replicate them (e.g., Page & Scheidt, 1971), led to considerable debate about the validity of the effect. But now, more than three decades later, it is clear that this “weapons effect” is real. It has been observed with knives as well as guns, with weapon pictures as well as real weapons, in field settings as well as the psychological laboratory. Early concerns that the weapons effect might be an artifact of participants’ suspicion or experimenter demand have been met by studies revealing the opposite: The weapons effect occurs only when participants are not suspicious or under heavy experimenter demand (Carlson, Marcus-Newhall, & Miller, 1990; Turner, Simons, Berkowitz, & Frodi, 1977). It is clear that the presence of a weapon—or even a picture of a weapon—can make people behave more aggressively. In essence, the gun helps pull the trigger. How might this occur? THE WEAPONS-AS-PRIMES HYPOTHESIS The current explanation for this phenomenon involves the priming process (e.g., Berkowitz, 1990, 1993; Geen, 1990). “Weapon” concepts (e.g., gun, sword, club) are linked closely to aggressionand hostilityrelated concepts in semantic memory because of their similarity in meaning and their close association in common experience. For instance, most experiences with guns come from incidents in which a gun is used to threaten or harm someone, common experiences from watching television and movies, and from reading front-page news. Within some of the poorer regions in some large U.S. cities, people also receive too many firsthand experiences with guns and violence. Figure 1 presents a simplified (and hypothetical) schematic of an associative memory structure in which the concept of “gun” is linked to a number of aggression-related concepts. It also shows (again in simplified form) two types of aggression-related concepts, several simple concepts and one more complex script (Abelson, 1981; Huesmann, in press). One assumption of this approach is that each concept in memory has an activation threshold . A concept may receive activation energy from various sources. When the total activation exceeds the threshold, the concept is activated and used. A second assumption is that concepts with similar meanings (e.g., hurt and harm) and those that frequently are activated simultaneously (e.g., shoot and gun), develop strong associations. These associations are illustrated by links between the concepts, with thicker lines representing stronger associations and shorter distances representing greater similarity of meaning. A third assumption is that when a concept is activated, its activation energy spreads to related concepts, as a function of how strongly they are associated. Scripts are sets of particularly well-rehearsed, highly associated concepts, often involving causal linkages, goals, and action plans (Abelson, 1981; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Because the items in a script are so highly associated, they may be thought of as a unitary concept in semantic memory as well. Figure 1 illustrates one such script, involving retaliation. Once associations with the concept “gun” have been formed, seeing a gun may increase the accessibility of the associated aggressive thoughts (including scripts) by a spreading-activation process (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Neely, 1977). Increased accessibility of hostile or aggressive thoughts may facilitate subsequent aggressive behavior in any of several ways, such as by biasing one’s interpretation of ongoing social interactions, or increasing the perceived appropriateness of an aggressive solution to a dispute. In the Figure 1 example, the sight of a gun activates the “gun” concept. Some activation spreads along associated pathways to other aggression-related concepts, including some that are in the retaliation script. If other aspects of the situation activate other parts of the script—for instance, if the person is struck in the back and experiences pain—the activation input gained from the mere presence of the gun may be sufficient to trigger the retaliation script both as an interpretational guide to perception (e.g., whether a shove was intentional or accidental) and as a behavioral guide for action.