N + 1 st Price Auction Based Replica Schemas Samee
نویسنده
چکیده
1 Abstract—This paper addresses the problem of fine-grained data replication on a set of Internet sites using the N+1 price auction. Specifically, we present an adaptive auction mechanism for replication of objects in a distributed system. The mechanism is adaptive in the sense that it changes the replica schema of the objects by continuously moving the schema towards an optimal one, while ensuring object concurrency control. The mechanism is experimentally evaluated against three well-known techniques from the literature: greedy, branch and bound, and genetic algorithms. The experimental results reveal that the proposed approach outperforms the three techniques in both the execution time and solution quality.
منابع مشابه
A Game Theoretical Extended Vickery Auction Mechanism for Replicating Data in Large-scale Distributed Computing Systems
This paper addresses the problem of finegrained data replication on a set of Internet sites using the extended form of Vickrey auction called the N+1 st price auction. Specifically, we present an adaptive auction mechanism for replication of objects in a distributed system. The mechanism is adaptive in the sense that it changes the replica schema of the objects by continuously moving the schema...
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