Technology Adoption in an OLG model with forward-looking agents

نویسندگان

  • Paolo Colla
  • Filomena Garcia
چکیده

We investigate the effects of forward looking behaviour in technology adoption. The setup is an overlapping generation model where agents choose between two alternative networks taking in consideration the installed base as well as the expected base. In other words users not only keep into account the actions of previous players, but also form expectations over future generations’ choices before deciding which technology to purchase. The latter element is the distinctive feature of our approach. Contrary to the existing literature, we consider users that receive technology benefits over their whole life-time, rather than only upon purchasing one technology. As multiplicity of equilibrium is to be expected we introduce stochastic payoffs such that agents coordinate their expectations on a unique outcome. We consider both the case of incompatible and compatible technology within our OLG setup, and show that technologies cannot lock-in, that is no technology can emerge as dominant in the long run. This realistic conclusion differs from standard results in the existing literature. We thank Rabah Amir, Paul Belleflame, Jean Gabszewicz, Jakub Steiner, Sebastian Pouget and seminar participants at several conferences for useful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the paper. Filomena Garcia gratefully acknowledges the support of a grant from the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia and Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia de Portugal. The usual disclaimer applies.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Core Discussion Paper 2004/41 Technology Adoption with Forward Looking Agents

We investigate the effects of forward looking behavior in technology adoption. The setup is an overlapping generation model where agents choose between two alternative networks taking in consideration both the installed base and the expected base. The latter element is the distinctive feature of our approach. We use results from the global games literature to select the unique equilibrium on wh...

متن کامل

A Dynamic Adoption Model with Bayesian Learning: An Application to U.S. Soybean Farmers

Adoption of agricultural technology is often sequential, with farmers first adopting a new technology on part of their lands and then adjusting their use of the new technology in later years based on what was learned from the initial partial adoption. Our paper explains this experimental behavior using a dynamic adoption model with Bayesian learning in which forward-looking farmers take account...

متن کامل

Learning-by-Doing and the Choice of Technology: The Role of Patience

Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) showed that when agents learn-by-doing and are myopic, less advanced agents may adopt new technologies while more advanced ̄rms stick with the old technology since the new technology takes time to learn. In this case, the less advanced agents might eventually overtake (or \leapfrog") the advanced agents. We show that this kind of overtaking can also occur if agents ar...

متن کامل

Assessing the Iranian Fiscal Sustainability in Past and Future through Tax Side of the Economy

This paper, I have focused on the tax side of the fiscal policy to  investigate the past and future behavior of fiscal sustainability in Iran. To do so, I have employed two different forward-looking and backward-looking approaches. First, the backward-looking approach is the fiscal policy rule proposed by Daving & Leeper (2011). Precisely, this rule determines that whether the fiscal policy is ...

متن کامل

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 an Overlapping Generations Model Core Equivalence Theorem

The classical Debreu-Scarf core equivalence theorem asserts that in an exchange economy with a finite number of agents art allocation (under certain conditions) is a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if it belongs to the core of every replica of the exchange economy. The pioneering work of P. Samuelson has shown that such a result fails to be true in exchange economies with a countable number o...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2011