Intermediation and Exclusive Representation in Financial Networks

نویسندگان

  • ITAY P. FAINMESSER
  • Shai Bernstein
  • Mark Dean
  • Matt Elliott
  • Glenn Ellison
چکیده

This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation. Consider an environment with repeated financial interactions in which strategic default is possible. We show that if interactions between any lender and borrower are infrequent and if market participants have incomplete knowledge of the patterns of interactions in the market, then all investments must be intermediated. Moreover, each intermediary must exclusively represent many lenders in their interactions with a given borrower, so that she can “punish” the borrower severely for any strategic default by eliminating the borrower’s access to many future loans. To this end, we develop a model of financial networks that are shaped by exogenous forces as well as by lenders’ decisions and new tools to study the ability of market participants to learn about the structure of the financial network. We then characterize networks that are robust – networks that can be sustained in equilibrium given (almost) any belief that is consistent with agents’ knowledge of the network structure. Our characterization sheds light on the complementarity and substitutability of selffinance clauses, the use of collateral, and intermediation; and suggests also that the riskiest and safest assets will be traded using full collateral, whereas the intermediately risky assets will be traded by intermediaries and without full collateral. The effect of macroeconomic conditions and the presence of credit bureaus on the patterns of intermediation are also studied.(JEL: C73, D42, D83, D85, D86, G20, L14)

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Long-term and Short-term Effects of Financial Intermediation on Economic Growth

Financial intermediation in Iran's banking system is negatively affected at least in two ways. First, there are many similarities between financial intermediation and usurious activities in the common interpretation of interest-free banking law. This encourages the banks to participate in various commercial activities. Second, the price setting policies of the central bank makes investment more...

متن کامل

Investigating the Effects of Financial Repression on Private Investment in Agriculture Sector

One of the present phenomena that virtually explain weaknesses in financial systems of different countries is financial repression. Financial repression encompasses the different interferences of governments in financial markets through determining the ceiling interest on bank deposits, high rates of legal reserves, and the government’s interference in distribution of bank credits,which prevent...

متن کامل

Identification of Critical Nodes and Links in Financial Networks with Intermediation and Electronic Transactions

In this paper, we propose a network performance/efficiency measure for the evaluation of financial networks with intermediation. The measure captures risk, transaction cost, price, transaction flow, revenue, and demand information in the context of the decision-makers’ behavior in multitiered financial networks that also allow for electronic transactions. The measure is then utilized to define ...

متن کامل

The Co-Evolution and Emergence of Integrated International Financial Networks and Social Networks: Theory, Analysis, and Computations

Globalization and technological advances, notably, in telecommunications networks and in the development of new financial instruments, have transformed the financial services landscape and their impacts have been studied empirically. In this paper, in contrast, we focus on the theoretical foundations of such transformations and we develop a rigorous dynamic supernetwork theory for the integrati...

متن کامل

Financial Intermediation Networks∗

We study a dynamic model of financial intermediation in which interbank lending is subject to moral hazard, where intermediaries can divert funds towards inefficient projects. We show that despite the presence of moral hazard, secured lending contracts can discipline the investment choices of all market participants — even those with whom they are not directly contracting — thus partially overc...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2012