Context Matters: Effects of the Proportion of Fundamentalists on Gender Attitudes*

Previous research has shown that fundamentalist religious beliefs and affiliations are associated with conservative gender attitudes. This study expands upon previous research by examining both the individual and contextual effects of conservative Protestantism on gender attitudes. Multilevel analysis of data from the General Social Surveys (1985–96) reveals a significant relationship between the proportion of fundamentalists in a state and conservative gender attitudes of white individuals within that state even after controlling for the individuals’ own religious affiliation, beliefs, and practices. Contextual effects are at the heart of the sociological enterprise. Émile Durkheim (1951:320) identified the existence of a contextual effect when he argued that “the group formed by associated individuals has a reality of a different sort from each individual considered singly. . . . [C]ollective states exist in the group from whose nature they spring.” More recently, Huckfeldt (1986:13) defined contextual effects as “instances in which individual behavior is affected by the presence of a social property in a population regardless of whether the individual possesses the property in question.” While the importance of context in examining gender equality has long been recognized, no previous studies have examined contextual effects, beyond region, on gender attitudes across the U.S. Substantial research has shown that individual fundamentalist Protestants have more conservative attitudes on gender roles (Brinkerhoff & MacKie 1984; Gay, Ellison & Powers 1996; Hertel & Hughes 1987; Hoffmann & Miller 1997). However, the effects of religion on gender attitudes may extend beyond the * Direct correspondence to Laura M. Moore, Department of Sociology and Social Work, Hood College, 401 Rosemont Avenue, Frederick, MD 21701. 116 / Social Forces 82:1, September 2003 boundaries of the individuals who are themselves fundamentalist Protestants. After summarizing the social science literature addressing the relationship between fundamentalism and gender attitudes, we utilize 1985–96 General Social Survey (GSS) data to test the hypothesis that white individuals’ conservative gender attitudes are related not only to their own individual characteristics but also to the proportion of fundamentalists in the state where they live. We find evidence to support this contextual hypothesis and conclude by discussing issues of causation and future avenues for research. Individual-Level Fundamentalism and Gender Attitudes Fundamentalist denominations originated largely out of nineteenth-century Holiness and Pentecostal movements (Ammerman 1987; Woodberry & Smith 1998). Fundamentalists tend to oppose the growth of secular influence in society (Hawley & Proudfoot 1994). They also tend to believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, personal salvation, the premillennial imminent return of Christ, and an evangelical need to convert others (Ammerman 1987; Woodberry & Smith 1998). Fundamentalist Protestants endorse traditional gender role attitudes in adherence to biblical passages that portray men as leaders but women as followers (Ammerman 1987; Bendroth 1993). The traditional hierarchy taught by fundamentalist churches is from God to man and from man to woman, with women’s roles defined as that of helpmate and mother (Kosmin & Lachman 1993). Accordingly, fundamentalists tend to oppose modern, modified gender roles wherein women have entered the paid workforce, sought more egalitarian divisions of household labor and asserted themselves more openly in marital decision making (Brown 1994; Kosmin & Lachman 1993). Even the earliest studies of gender attitudes noted the association of religious denominations and beliefs with conservative gender attitudes (Mason & Bumpass 1975). Using 1972–84 GSS data, Hertel and Hughes (1987) found white Protestant fundamentalists to retain the most conservative attitudes on women’s home, work, and political roles. Baptists, Catholics, Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Jews, and those reporting no religious affiliation showed progressively more liberal gender attitudes. The conservative fundamentalist effect remained strong after controlling for age, income, education, and region. Hoffmann and Miller (1997) report from their longitudinal analysis of 1972–94 GSS data that while conservative Protestant (southern Baptists, Evangelicals, Fundamentalist, Nazarenes, Pentecostals, Church of Christ) support for egalitarian gender roles has increased, this group is still among the most conservative. Using 1982–91 GSS data, Gay, Ellison, and Powers (1996) find that white southern Baptists and other fundamentalist and Context Matters / 117 evangelical members report the most conservative attitudes on profamily issues such as gender roles, abortion, and sexuality. Again, these effects remain after controlling for several individual-level variables. However, Gay, Ellison, and Powers (1996) document some internal heterogeneity on gender role attitudes within conservative Protestant denominations forcing researchers to reexamine assumptions of a monolithic fundamentalist/evangelical group. They suggest that issues of female employment and household decision making are “more nuanced and negotiated than previously recognized” (13). The strong relationship between fundamentalism and conservative gender attitudes has also been documented by studies using more specific, unrepresentative samples (Brinkerhoff & Mackie 1984: Martin et al. 1980; Thornton, Alwin & Camburn 1983; Thornton & Freedman 1979; Wilcox 1986) and by studies measuring fundamentalism as individual beliefs (Brinkerhoff & MacKie 1984: Wilcox 1986). Contextual-Level Analyses of Gender Attitudes In research using U.S. data, region has been the primary contextual-level variable used in analyses of gender attitudes. Several studies have found that conservative gender attitudes are concentrated in the South (Burris 1983; Hurlbert 1989; Mason, Czajka & Arber 1976; Rice & Coates 1995). Hurlbert (1989) found white southerners to be significantly more conservative on women’s issues even after controlling for individuals’ religion, rural/urban residence, income, education, prestige, age, sex, union membership, and year of survey. More recently, Rice and Coates (1995) found a similar southern difference with updated GSS data (1972–93) and a broader sample that included blacks and whites. Because these studies control for a comprehensive set of individual variables, the results support a subcultural hypothesis versus a simple compositional hypothesis (Johnson & Stokes 1984). The compositional hypothesis would explain the more conservative gender attitudes found in regions like the U.S. South as merely a consequence of the region’s greater number of individuals possessing traits associated with conservative gender attitudes — such as lower education levels, rural residence, and fundamentalist religious affiliations. In contrast, the subcultural hypothesis claims that the regional effect is above and beyond the summation of individual traits; that is, it is a contextual effect. However, to date no studies have gone beyond identifying the southern difference and attributing its cause to a unique regional subculture. What is it about the South that makes people hold more conservative gender attitudes? We believe that the South–non-South difference found in earlier studies is primarily a contextual effect resulting from the more prevalent religious fundamentalism in the South. Although the South is becoming increasingly 118 / Social Forces 82:1, September 2003 indistinguishable from the rest of the country on structural measures such as urbanization, industrialization, occupational distribution, income, and education, its disproportionate population of fundamentalists remains a distinctive southern marker (Falk & Lyson 1988, Goldschmidt 1963; Kasarda, Hughes & Irwin 1991; Mayo 1964; McKinney & Bourque 1971; Reisman 1965). Kosmin and Lachman (1993:52) note that the southern Bible Belt is composed primarily of Baptists — many of them fundamentalist southern Baptists who “form a formidable cultural force in shaping the outlook of the populace and social institutions of the region.” Fundamentalist Protestants compose more than 40% of the census South compared to approximately 19% outside the South (Kosmin & Lachman 1993). We contend that the “formidable cultural force” of Bible Belt fundamentalists represents a contextual effect on gender attitudes that goes well beyond the compositional effects explained by different characteristics of individual southerners. Only one study has investigated a contextual effect of religion on gender attitudes and that study used European data. Banaszak and Plutzer (1993) measure four distinct aspects of European social context: (1) religiosity levels, (2) divorce levels, (3) women’s education relative to men, and (4) women’s economic participation relative to men. After controlling for individual-level effects (country, education, marital status, number of children, female work status, age, leftist party support, family income, size of community, and religiosity), they found contextual-level effects for educational levels among both men and women and contextual-level effects for women’s labor-force rates and divorce rates for women. They did not find any support for the contextual effects of religiosity for either women or men beyond the individual-level effects for which they controlled. However, Europe may lack sufficient variance on religion to produce a significant contextual effect. In contrast, the U.S. has continued to display higher levels of church affiliation and religiosity than most other industrialized nations (Kosmin & Lachman 1993; Sherkat & Ellison 1999). We believe that American data may reveal stronger contextual effects than European data.