Evolution of Agents with Moral Sentiments in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Exercise
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Agents with Moral Sentiments in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Exercise
We present the results of a simulation of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma where some agents behave rationally and others have moral sentiments towards those from the same social group. They suggest that in societies where agents can possess such characteristics, to behave rationally, in the usual sense in Game Theory~ is not the best attitude for good performance in the long run, both individua...
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We have been experimenting on simulations of a society of agents where some of them have “moral sentiments” towards the agents that belong to the same social group, using the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma as a metaphor for the social interactions. We were able to observe the well-understood phenomenon of short-sighted, self-interested agents performing well in the short-term but ruining their cha...
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We present a simulation of a society of agents where some of them have \moral sentiments" towards the agents that belong to the same social group, using the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma as a metaphor for the social interactions. Besides the well-understood phenomenon of shortsighted , self-interested agents performing well in the short-term but ruining their chances of such performance in the lo...
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