CS 294 - 1 Algorithmic Aspects of Game Theory Spring 2001 Lecture 2 : January 23

CS 6840 : Algorithmic Game Theory Spring 2017 Lecture 23 : March 22

For some auction, let v1...vn be bidder valuations for bidder i (potentially a vector of valuations, for multiitem auctions). Bidders bid some value bi, such that b = (b1, ...bn). Bidders seek to maximize some utility ui(b, vi), dependent on both the auction outcomes caused by other bids and their own valuation profile. For some distribution over bids N (where b can be sampled from N), this imp...

CS 559 : Algorithmic Aspects of Computer Networks Spring 2010 Lecture 18 — March 25 , 30

In today’s lecture, we learned fundamental basic about Algorithmic mechanism design [2]. Most of research was done in routing or load balancing assuming that each participant acts as instructed and information is globally known while they follow their own selish interest rather than algorithm. Mechanism Design as a subfield of game theory deals with such problems. It tries to motivate agents to...

CS294-1 Algorithmic Aspects of Game Theory Spring 2001

CMSC 858 F : Algorithmic Game Theory Fall 2010 Market Clearing with Applications

We will look at MARKET CLEARING or MARKET EQUILIBRIUM prices. We will consider two models with linear utilities : FISHER model and ARROWDEBREU model. See [1] and chapter 5 of [2] for more details. Finally we see an application of the FISHER model to wireless networks. I have also used as reference the scribe notes for this same lecture when this course was taught by Prof. Hajiaghayi at Rutgers ...

CS 364 A : Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture # 18 : From External Regret to Swap Regret and the Minimax Theorem ∗

Last lecture we proved that coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) are tractable, in a satisfying sense: there are simple and computationally efficient learning procedures that converge quickly to the set of CCE. Of course, if anything in our equilibrium hierarchy (Figure 1) was going to be tractable, it was going to be CCE, the biggest set. The good researcher is never satisfied and always seeks s...