Non-zero-sum Dresher inspection games
نویسندگان
چکیده
An inspection game is here a non-cooperative two-person-game between an inspector and an inspectee. It models a situation where the inspector controls the inspectee who has an incentive to violate certain legal obligations. A recent survey of inspection games applied to data verification, for example in nuclear material safeguards, is given in [1]. Dresher [2] described a sequential inspection game of n stages or time periods. The inspector can allocate m inspections to these periods, 0 ≤ m ≤ n . The inspectee knows at each stage the number of past inspections. He can decide to act legally or in at most one period to violate where he is caught iff the inspector simultaneously inspects. In [2], the game is zero-sum, with payoff zero for legal action and where the gain for the inspectee if he is undetected equals his loss if he is caught. This last assumption has been generalized by Höpfinger [3]. The present paper treats this game Γ(n,m) with non-zero-sum payoffs. A closely related game with announced inspection strategies has been solved by Maschler [5].
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