Defeating Us Coercion

The bombing of Serbia that began on 24 March 1999 typifies the logic that underlies the use of force by the United States and its NATO allies. Their air strikes and cruise-missile attacks were designed not to defeat the Serbian government, but to coerce Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to accept a political settlement. Instead of having to destroy his forces completely or to remove his government from power, it was hoped that the limited application of military force would convince Milosevic to change his mind and embrace peace. The Kosovo crisis, of course, is only the latest example of this tendency to coerce rather than demolish foes. Successful coercion – the use of threatened force to modify an adversary's behaviour – should be simple for the US which, since the demise of the Soviet Union, has found itself without rivals in military might, political influence or economic strength. Because of these overwhelming advantages, the US can threaten any conceivable adversary in a variety of ways, with little danger of a major defeat. Yet coercion remains difficult. Despite the lopsided US edge in raw power, regional foes regularly defy threats and ultimatums: against Somali militants, Serb nationalists, the Iraqi dictator and other adversaries, the US record of coercion has at best been mixed. Even when threats are carried out, adversary resistance often actually increases rather than decreases. Why do the United States and its allies so often find themselves unable to force lesser adversaries to change behaviour? The uneven record is partially explained by the common axioms of coercive diplomacy. Coercion generally requires a credible threat of 'pain' beyond the benefits which an adversary may anticipate through resistance. 1 The authors who first explored the nature of coercion and articulated this formulation, however, did not anticipate a world in which the US would impose constraints on its own use of force and therefore on the level of pain that it can realistically deliver. Adversaries can capitalise on such constraints and win a coercive contest despite being militarily, politically and economically inferior. The present situation stems from the new strategic reality faced by the United States and its allies. Most obviously, the threat of nuclear annihilation no longer colours coercive crises: local conflicts in Angola, Somalia or other