Research cooperation and international standards in a model of coalition stability

Suggestions on international cooperation in climate policy beyond 2012 include substituting or complementing international environmental agreements (IEA) with technology oriented agreements (TOA). We look at the impact of TOA on environmental cooperation in the framework of coalition stability. Using a numerical model, we analyze the differences of several TOA and how they interact. We find that participation in and environmental effectiveness of the IEA are raised less effectively when the TOA focuses on mitigation technology rather than augmenting productivity, which is due to the former having an effect on all actors via emissions, whereas effects of the latter are exclusive to research partners. For the same reason, we find that restricting the effects of R&D cooperation is credible only in case of productivity. Technology standards may fail to foster participation when they are restricting members and non-members alike, and may suffer from inefficiencies. However, when implemented as a complementary instrument, these disadvantages did not apply. Separately negotiated technology standards may hence facilitate participation in an IEA without adding to its complexity.