A price-setting game with a nonatomic fringe
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper extends the Bertrand–Edgeworth price-setting game with finitely many firms to a game with infinitely many firms. Taking a market with one significant firm and a nonatomic fringe, we present a microfoundation of dominant-firm price leadership. 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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