The Political Foundations of Redistribution and Equality in Postindustrial Capitalist Democracies

Does the organization of business matter for redistribution and labor market equality in post-industrial democratic capitalism? Conventional welfare state analysis has given this significant question scant attention. We argue, however, that high levels of employer organization, as well as the persistence of centralized bargaining and national policy formation between these well organized employers and comparably organized labor (or macrocorporatism), are likely to foster employer support for progressive policies, strengthen labor support for egalitarian policies that encompass the interests of labor market outsiders, and otherwise promote redistributive policies and outcomes. We test our arguments with quantitative analysis of early 1980s-to-2000s pooled time-series data from 18 nations as well as brief, illustrative case analysis of policy change in Denmark and Germany We find that highly organized employers as well as macrocorporatism are consistently, strongly, and positively related to overall government redistribution among working-age families, social protection for workers, and active labor market policies. They are also strongly and negatively related to the prevalence of low-wage labor, market income inequality, and other features of labor market dualism such as involuntary part-time work, temporary contract jobs, and long-term unemployment. These quantitative results emerge in models that account for electoral and partisan politics, features of postindustrialization and economic performance, and other forces highlighted in recent work on redistribution and inequality in contemporary capitalist democracies.