What Does Reputation Buy ? Differentiation in a Market for Third - party Auditors
نویسندگان
چکیده
* Duflo: MIT Department of Economics, 50 Memorial Dr., E52252G, Cambridge, MA 02142 (e-mail: [email protected]); Greenstone: MIT Department of Economics, 50 Memorial Dr., E52-359, Cambridge, MA 02142 (e-mail: [email protected]); Pande: Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Mailbox 46, 79 JFK St., Cambridge, MA 02138 (e-mail: [email protected]); Ryan: Harvard Weatherhead Center, K239 1737 Cambridge St., Cambridge, MA 02138 (e-mail: [email protected]). We thank the GPCB for partnering in this research. Ryan Kellogg, Andrew Foster and Seema Jayachandran provided helpful comments. We thank SSP, HUCE, CEEPR, IGC, 3ie and the NSF (SES Award #1066006) for funding and Sam Norris for Research Assistance.
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