Budget Constraints and Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
The possibility, even if arbitrarily small, of binding budget constraints in simultaneous ascending induces strategic demand reduction, and generates significant inefficiencies. Under mild conditions on the distributions of the bidders’ values, unconstrained bidders behave as if they were liquidity constrained, even as the probability that bidders are budget constrained goes to zero. JEL classification number: D44 [H]
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