Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good

Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good

In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition. This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain should include ``a minimally rich domain.'' We first characterize generalized median voter schemes as the unique class of strategy-proof...

Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies

Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies1

We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We fi...

Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods

1 1 The authors thank the Indian Statistical Institute at New Delhi and the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of the University of Maastricht for their hospitality. Thanks are also due to Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken, and the anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a conve...

A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategyproofness and no-vetoer.