Lewis on Knowledge Ascriptions
نویسنده
چکیده
David Lewis’s primary contribution to the theory of knowledge is his account of knowledge ascription, which integrates an elegant version of relevant alternatives theory with a detailed version of contextualism. His account is prefigured in his discussion of accommodation in “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979), and forms the central topic of his “Elusive Knowledge” (1996). I will review his account (§1), and then discuss some epistemic (§2) and semantic (§3) questions arising. This will be a friendly critique: I am sympathetic with the outlines of Lewis’s contextualist relevant alternatives theory, but would amend some details.
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