Informational Effects of Regulation FD: Evidence from Rating Agencies

This paper studies changes in the information environment brought about by Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), which was implemented on October 23, 2000. FD now prohibits U.S. public companies from making selective, non-public disclosures to favored analysts and portfolio managers. FD, however, has a number of exclusions, one of which still allows disclosure of nonpublic information to credit rating agencies. As a result, rating agencies now have access to confidential information that is not made available to equity analysts any more. This can potentially increase the value of credit ratings to equity investors. We examine a sample of credit rating changes and their effect on the company’s stock price. We find that the informational effect of downgrades and upgrades is much bigger in the post-FD period. Apparently, FD conferred a strategic advantage to the agencies.