Truthful Combinatorial Double Auction For Combinatorial Exchanges

First-come-first-serve (FCFS) scheme is used for selling the goods in market that is a multi-million dollar industry for any popular event. But in a competitive environment is this FCFS efficient? In earlier literature it has been shown that the auction based alternative solutions using the framework of mechanism design, a sub field of game theory [18] can provide better results against FCFS in terms of profit making and efficiency in allocation. However the solution proposed in the earlier literature can address the selling environment where an agent can give demand for a single good that is they have single/Multi unit demand. However there might be a situation where a seller wishes to sell in the combination of goods and buyer wishes to buy in some combinations. It is highly difficult to solve a combinatorial double auction where sellers and buyers bids simultaneously. In this paper we proposed two algorithms of which one is truthful produces a solution which is very near to optimal by assuming some prefix base value for each good and another algorithm provides a solution by dividing the seller sub group and buyer sub group. Keywords—Double Auction, Combinatorial Exchanges, Mechanism Design.