Introducing Nash equilibria via an online casual game which people actually play
نویسندگان
چکیده
This is an extended write-up of a lecture introducing the concept of Nash equilibrium in the context of an auction-type game which one can observe being played by “ordinary people” in real time. In a simplified model we give an explicit formula for the Nash equilibrium. The actual game is more complicated and more interesting; players place a bid on one item (amongst several) during a time window; they can see the numbers, but not the values, of previous bids on each item. A complete theoretical analysis of the Nash equilibrium now seems a challenging research problem. We give an informal analysis and compare with data from the actual game.
منابع مشابه
Introducing Nash Equilibria via an Online Casual Game That People Actually Play
This is an extended write-up of a lecture introducing the concept of Nash equilibrium in the context of an auction-type game that one can observe being played by “ordinary people” in real time. In a simplified model, we give an explicit formula for the Nash equilibrium. The actual game is more complicated and more interesting; players place a bid on one item (among several) during a time window...
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