Preserving Non-Democracies: Leaders and State Institutions in the Middle East

After nearly two decades of studying the causes, processes and outcomes of transitions to democracy, scholars in recent years have again shown a growing interest in the study of the ways and means through which non-democracies maintain themselves in power. Dictators and dictatorships, of course, seldom lack creativity when it comes to staying power, and when creativity fails there is always brute force. Despite this recent proliferation of scholarship on the durability of dictatorships, insufficient attention has been paid to the dictators’ manipulation of institutions as a way to deepen and solidify their hold on power. This article examines the relationship between state leaders and state institutions, focusing on the reasons for and the ways through which institutional change is used as a means to consolidate political power. Most explanations of the perseverance of authoritarianism point to the political consequences of rentierism, or the strength of the ruling coalition in relation to potential political opponents, or the ‘robustness of the coercive apparatus’ of the state. This article posits an additional causal factor: dictators may inherit or create institutions, but then they actively guard against the institutions’ independence. When and if these institutions demonstrate too much independence, or exhibit signs that they might actually become platforms for political opposition, then they are simply closed or disbanded by leaders. Especially in the Middle East, where political leaders have been able to maintain the upper hand in relation to institutions through control over the accrual and distribution of rent revenues, institutional tinkering, or wholesale institutional change, is often used to pre-empt the potential emergence of centres of political opposition. Deliberate institutional change is often used as a source of authoritarian sustenance. Using three case studies in the Middle East – Egypt, Kuwait, and Iran – the article argues that choices and bargains made early on by state leaders are critical determinants of the institutional make-up and features of the state. As time goes by and as institutions age, they tend to become more subject to path dependence, thus limiting the scope of decisions open to state actors. Things change, however, if and when state leaders determine that major institutional adjustments are needed in order for them to stay in power, at which time decisions outside of established institutional frameworks are taken in order to safeguard dictatorial prerogatives. In other words, dictators often resort to both ‘rational choice’ and ‘path dependence’ in order to maintain themselves in power. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, 251–270, March 2010