Subjectivism without Desire †

For the purposes of this paper, subjectivism about well-being holds that φ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, φ is valued, under the proper conditions, by x.1 The natural contrast view, objectivism, holds that there are facts about any given person’s well-being that are independent of that person’s evaluative perspective. For subjectivism, unlike objectivism, a person’s evaluative perspective, under the right conditions, determines that which is good for her, and how good it is for her. Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists.2 Most commonly, subjectivists have disagreed about what might be called the “theory of favored conditions”: what sort of conditions must apply to x for x ’s valuation of φ to render φ intrinsically good for x. For instance, some have held that φ is good for x if and only if x, under her actual conditions, values φ.3 Alternatively, some have held that φ is good for x if and only if x would value φ under certain idealized or counterfactual conditions, i.e., had x undergone cognitive psychotherapy, or