Randomness enhances cooperation: a resonance-type phenomenon in evolutionary games.
نویسندگان
چکیده
We investigate the effect of randomness in both relationships and decisions on the evolution of cooperation. Simulation results show, in such randomness' presence, the system evolves more frequently to a cooperative state than in its absence. Specifically, there is an optimal amount of randomness, which can induce the highest level of cooperation. The mechanism of randomness promoting cooperation resembles a resonancelike fashion, which could be of particular interest in evolutionary game dynamics in economic, biological, and social systems.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics
دوره 75 4 Pt 2 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007