Non-paternalistic altruism and welfare economics
نویسنده
چکیده
Bergstrom showed that a necessary condition for a Pareto optimum with non-paternalistic altruism is classification as a selfish Pareto optimum. This paper shows that Bergstrom’s result does not generalize to the benefit-cost analysis of generic changes in public goods. There may exist good projects that will be rejected by a selfish-benefit cost test, a selfish test error. Selfish test error is linked to preference interdependence between public goods and income distribution, the same condition Musgrave identified as problematic for optimal public goods provision without altruism. Transferable selfish utilities provide freedom from selfish test error. JEL Classifications: H41, D64, D61
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