Bruno de Finetti and imprecision: Imprecise probability does not exist!
نویسندگان
چکیده
We review several of de Finetti’s fundamental contributions where these have played and continue to play an important role in the development of imprecise probability research. Also, we discuss de Finetti’s few, but mostly critical remarks about the prospects for a theory of imprecise probabilities, given the limited development of imprecise probability theory as that was known to him.
منابع مشابه
Bruno de Finetti and Imprecision
We review several of de Finetti’s fundamental contributions where these have played and continue to play an important role in the development of imprecise probability research. Also, we discuss de Finetti’s few, but mostly critical remarks about the prospects for a theory of imprecise probabilities, given the limited development of imprecise probability theory as that was known to him.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Approx. Reasoning
دوره 53 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012