Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability in finite populations

نویسندگان

  • Wieland Müller
  • Hans-Theo Normann
چکیده

Recently it has been shown that consistent conjectures are evolutionarily stable. In this note we show that this finding depends on the use of the infinite population ESS (Maynard-Smith, Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982). When applying the finitepopulation ESS (Schaffer, J Theor Biol 132:469–478, 1988) we show that the conjectures surviving in the long run are not consistent.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability: A new rationale for consistency∗

Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations Þrms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, Þrms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines Þtness in the evolutionary game. We show that the unique conjectures which are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they anticipate rivals’ behavior correctly.

متن کامل

Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A Rationale for Consistency

Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations firms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, firms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines fitness in the evolutionary game. Based on linear heterogeneous Cournot and Bertrand competition models, we show that the unique conjectures that are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they a...

متن کامل

Cooperation , commitment , and other - regarding behavior in duopoly games

Aalto University, P.O. Box 11000, FI-00076 Aalto www.aalto.fi Author Ilkka Leppänen Name of the doctoral dissertation Cooperation, commitment, and other-regarding behavior in duopoly games Publisher School of Science Unit Mathematics and Systems Analysis Series Aalto University publication series DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS 131/2016 Field of research Systems and Operations Research F017Z Manuscript ...

متن کامل

Evolutionary history of subspecies of Eurasian nuthatches (Sitta europaea persica) from Zagros Mountains, Iran

Abstract. Eurasian Nuthatch (Sitta europaea), with 18 subspecies, has a wide distribution in deciduous forests of Eurasia. The subspecies S.e.persica is a resident bird in the Zagros Mountains, from north-west to south-west of Iran. The aim of this study was to evaluate the taxonomic and phylogenetic relationships of this subspecies to European, Asian, as well as Caucasian clades. For this purp...

متن کامل

Conjectural variations in aggregative games: An evolutionary perspective

Suppose that in symmetric aggregative games, in which payoffs depend only on a player’s strategy and on an aggregate of all players’ strategies, players have conjectures about the reaction of the aggregate to marginal changes in their strategy. The players play a conjectural variation equilibrium, which determines their fitness payoffs. The paper shows that only consistent conjectures can be ev...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2006