Algorithmic Game Theory March 2 , 2017 Lecture 13
نویسنده
چکیده
In this lecture, we bring money into the picture, while still thinking about a “matching” like problem. Suppose we have: 1. We have m goods G for sale 2. n buyers i who each have valuation functions over bundles, vi : 2 G → [0, 1]. Buyers have quasi-linear utility functions, which means they can (linearly) trade off their value for goods and their value for money. If each good j ∈ G has a price pj , then a buyer i gets the following utility for buying a bundle S ⊆ G: ui(S) = vi(S)− ∑
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