Analysis of Receipt-freeness in the Internet Voting Protocol with Applied Pi Calculus

The practical Internet voting protocols should have: privacy, completeness, soundness, unreusability, fairness, eligibility, and invariableness, universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, and coercion-resistance. Privacy describes the fact that a particular vote in a particular way is not revealed to anyone. Receipt-freeness means that the voter can not produce a receipt to prove that he votes a special ballot. Its purpose is to protect against vote buying. Formal method is an important tool to assess these properties of Internet voting protocols. To our knowledge few properties are analyzed with formal method. The applied pi calculus can be used to model and verify the security protocols, such as Internet voting protocols and electronic commerce protocols. In this paper, firstly, we research the privacy and receipt-freeness. Then we analyze a typical Internet voting protocol with applied pi calculus. According to the result of analysis we point out that the typical protocol has privacy and receipt-freeness properties.