Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration

=255223 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reviewing experimental evidence on fairness and reciprocity). 156. Scott & Stephan, Leviathan, supra note 143, at 102. 157. Id. 158. Fehr 8c Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 143, at lbO-70. 159. Ernst Fehr 8c Simon Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? 1 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 34, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=313028 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Fehr 8c Gächter, Incentive Contracts] . 160. For discussion, see Scott, Indefinite Agreements, upra note 137, at 1688-92. 161. See, e.g., Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 131, 132 (2001) (finding that "intermediate l vels of contract enforcement lead to crowding out, but low levels induce crowding in"); Bruno Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. Econ. Survs. 589, 596-606 (2001) (surveying empirical literature in support of motivation crowding theory); Fehr 8c Gächter, Incentive Contracts, supra note 159, at 15-30 (reporting results of study showing that "voluntary cooperation may ... be undermined by incentive contracts"); Bruno S. Frey 8c Matthias Benz, Motivation Transfer Effect 1, 9-13 (June 12, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http:// www.iew.uzh.ch/home/benz/downloads/MTE.pdf (finding "experimental evidence . . . [that] incentives can reduce intrinsic motivation even in areas not subject to the incentive