On the alleged perversity of the evidential view of testimony

1. My wife tells me that it’s raining, and as a result, I now have a reason to believe that it’s raining. But what kind of reason for belief does her testimony provide me with? According to the evidential view of testimony (EVT), what my wife’s testimony provides me with is evidence: evidence indicating that she believes that it’s raining, which then indicates that it is indeed raining. Until recently, most epistemologists of testimony, both reductionist and non-reductionist, accepted some version of EVT. In recent years, however, EVT has met with an objection in the form of what I will label the perversity argument. The perversity argument was first presented by Richard Moran (2005) and elaborated by Faulkner (2007, 2011) and others. They argue that in conceiving of the reason for belief provided by testimony as evidence, EVT mischaracterizes the kind of reasons normally provided to an audience by speakers’ testimony. The problem with such an evidential view of testimony, it is argued, is that thought of as evidence, testimony is evidence that is deliberately produced in order to make others believe. But to the extent that testimony is to be thought of as evidence, its deliberate nature undermines its epistemic status. As a result, EVT portrays us as perversely according to testimony having a privileged status as a vehicle for knowledge. Against this, I want to argue that in spite of its initial plausibility, the perversity argument fails. For there is no reason to think that the deliberate nature of testimony, as such, diminishes its status as evidence.