Zero-Sum Games: Minimax Equilibria
نویسنده
چکیده
Matching Pennies is a well-known example of a two player, zero-sum game. In this game, each of the players, the matcher and the mismatcher, flips a coin, and the payoffs are determined as follows. If the coins come up matching (i.e., both heads or both tails), then the matcher wins, so the mismatcher pays the matcher the sum of $1. If the coins do not match (i.e., one head and one tail), then the mismatcher wins, so the matcher pays the mismatcher the sum of $1. In Figure 1, player 1 is the mismatcher and player 2 is the matcher. This game is called zero-sum because the payoffs in each cell of the matrix sum to zero.
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