A Generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players’ ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions. For 2-player problems we characterize a larger class of solutions. None of these results assumes a Pareto axiom. In the 2-player case, adding strong Pareto efficiency to a subset of our axioms pins down the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
منابع مشابه
Fairness in Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
A bargaining solution guarantees minimal equity if each player’s payoff is at least as large as the minimum of the payoffs assigned to him by the equal-gain (i.e., egalitarian) and equal-loss solutions. The KalaiSmorodinsky solution is the unique scale-invariant 2-person solution with this property. There does not exist a scale-invariant n-person solution with this property.
متن کاملBargaining in Monetary Economies.∗
Search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on Nash (1950) bargaining, or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome, to determine the terms of trade. By considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a simple search model with divisible money, we show how this choice matters for important results such as the ability of the optimal monetary policy to generate an ef...
متن کاملAlternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems
This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nash’s original axioms. ∗ We are grateful to the referee and t...
متن کاملBargaining and the value of money
Search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on Nash (1950) bargaining, or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome, to determine the terms of trade. By considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a simple search model with divisible money, we show how this choice matters for important results such as the ability of the optimal monetary policy to generate an ef...
متن کاملCharacterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills
In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, Consistency w.r.t. Technological Innovations, so that the nonwelfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016