Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper challenges the prevailing view that strict informational lobbying (in the absence of political contributions and evidence distortion) leads to better policy outcomes. Key to our analysis is the fact that policymakers are constrained on the number of issues they can address, which forces them to prioritize issues. We show how interest groups advocating reform on less-important issues may have greater incentive to produce information, which can lead policymakers to prioritize those reforms over more-salient ones. Such distortion of the policy agenda leads to worse policy outcomes and lower constituent welfare. Our story is consistent with empirical accounts of the lobbying process.
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