Rawls versus Utilitarianism in the Light of Political Liberalism

The critique of utilitarianism forms a crucial subplot in the complex analysis of social justice that John Rawls develops in his first book, A Theory of Justice. 1 The weaknesses of utilitarianism indicate the need for an alternative theory, and at many stages of the argument the test for the adequacy of the new theory that Rawls elaborates is whether it can be demonstrated to be superior to the utilitarian rival. The account of social justice shifts in the transition to Rawls's second great book, Political Liberalism. The account of what is wrong with utilitarianism undergoes revision as well. In this essay I examine both the initial critique of utilitarianism and its transformation in Rawls's later writings. To anticipate my conclusion: Rawls's proposal that we should maximin rather than maximize leads to an interesting standoff. The argument for maximin is not compelling, but straight additive maximization of the utilitarian sort is revealed to be merely one possible function among many, any of which (for all we know) correct morality might instruct us to maximize. Rawls further urges that utilitarianism goes astray in taking the maximandum, the thing to be maximized, to be utility rather than primary social goods. The argument for primary social goods is not compelling, but it does not follow that utility alone is to be maximized. The espousal of the ideal of legitimacy in Political Liberalism does not affect these conclusions, and the arguments 2 advanced to support that ideal are either diversionary or question-begging with respect to the debate between utilitarianism and Rawlsian justice as fairness. For purposes of this exercise, utilitarianism may be understood as the doctrine that an institutional arrangement, a social policy, or an individual action is morally right just in case it is the one that, compared to the available alternatives, maximizes utility. Rawls assumes that justice is the overriding, preeminent part of the morality of institiutions, so he formulates the doctrine in this way: " society is righly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfactions summed over all the individuals belonging to it " (p. 22). He understands utility (human welfare) as the satisfaction of rational desire. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY Perhaps the animating philosophical idea in A Theory of Justice is that utilitarianism does not take rights seriously, that not taking rights seriously is a grave defect, and …