Viewpoint : Nuclear Safeguards as an Evolutionary System
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1999 Mr. John Carlson is Director General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO). Dr. Victor Bragin is Safeguards Adviser at ASNO. Mr. John Bardsley is Assistant Secretary of ASNO. Mr. John Hill is Head of the International Safeguards Section at ASNO. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and does not necessarily represent Australian government policy. Nuclear safeguards are a key element in international action against the spread of nuclear weapons. Safeguards are directed at the verification of peaceful use commitments: commitments given by states through international agreements to use nuclear materials and facilities for exclusively peaceful purposes. Through inspections and evaluations, conducted principally by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), safeguards serve to verify states’ peaceful use declarations. Although the current safeguards system is generally limited to verifying that states’ declarations are correct, new safeguards aim to verify that these declarations are complete as well. This reflects recognition that, in addition to deterring the diversion of nuclear materials from declared facilities, it is becoming more important to identify potential proliferation that is not based on diversion from known facilities. This viewpoint seeks to highlight some key areas in which the safeguards system is evolving in response to this new challenge.
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